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“[I]n this world, with great power there must also come—great 
responsibility.”1 
I. BACKGROUND—CAVEAT EMPTOR 
“Life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness”2 form the cornerstones 
of American independence.  Having freed themselves from the yoke of 
colonial oppression while living on a continent resplendent with natural 
resources, Americans were imbued with an abundant source of 
individualism.3  By 1787, the United States Constitution recognized that 
a government with limited powers was not welcome to intrude upon free 
enterprise.4  Merchants in America were free to determine the saleable 
qualities of their goods.5  The interaction between a merchant and a 
consumer was governed by the presumption in favor of the freedom of 
contract.6 
Historically, aggrieved consumers could seek a remedy by filing an 
action against a merchant and the judiciary would determine whether any 
impropriety tainted the transaction.  In their moving papers the 
complainant would be required to plead common law causes of action in 
either contract or tort law.  The policy of minimal government 
intervention in transactions between private parties predominated 
America’s economic landscape.  The results of legal actions would 
largely be governed by the aphorism caveat emptor, “let the buyer 
beware.”  Judicial reliance on this maxim was often predicated upon the 
belief that buyers and sellers, before the industrial revolution, had an 
equal responsibility to judge the quality of the goods being sold.7  These 
individuals, negotiating at “arm’s length,” were thought to be in equal 
position to one another and therefore competent to judge both the goods 
and services being bought and sold in the marketplace. 
 
 1  Kimble v. Marvel Ent., LLC, 135 S.Ct. 2401, 2415 (2015) (citing Stan Lee & Steve 
Ditko, Introducing Spider Man, Amazing Fantasy, Aug. 1962, at 13. 
 2  THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, at ⁋ 2 (1776).  
 3  Walton H. Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 YALE L.J. 1133, 1183 
(1931).  
 4  Id. 
 5  Id. 
 6  Michael S. Greve, Consumer Law, Class Actions and the Common Law, 7 CHAP. L. 
REV. 155, 157 (2004). 
 7  See JOANNA SHEPHERD, AM. TORT REFORM FOUND., THE EXPANSION OF NEW JERSEY’S 
CONSUMER FRAUD ACT: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 3 (2014).  See, e.g., Francis H. Bohlen, 
The Basis of Affirmative Obligations in the Law of Tort, 53 AM. L. REG. 273, 337-38 (1905); 
Hamilton, supra note 3. 
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A. Early New Jersey Case Law 
The 1793 case of Mason v. Evans involved an “action of debt” on a 
bond.8  The Supreme Court of Judicature of New Jersey, in its opinion, 
noted that there was a cause of action available to the defendant, an 
“action of covenant on his warranty.”9  The court further noted that if the 
defendant “omit[ted] that prudent precaution, the maxim of caveat 
emptor [was] fairly applicable.”10  One year later, in 1794, the Supreme 
Court of Judicature of New Jersey issued its opinion in the case of 
Journey v. Hunt.11  In addressing the seller’s vague representations 
regarding a tract of land the Court held, “[t]he purchaser in every case, 
more especially when the representation is couched in . . . ambiguous and 
general words . . . [should] satisfy himself of the quality of the land by 
previous inquiry or personal examination.”12  The Court went on to hold 
that, “[t]he maxim of caveat emptor is a just and valuable one, and its 
application to a case like the present cannot be considered harsh or 
iniquitous.”13  This legal principle, which placed a burden upon the buyer 
to check both the quality and suitability of goods before a purchase, 
appeared to be embedded in the Garden State’s jurisprudence.  
Furthermore, these cautionary watchwords would not be limited in their 
application to transactions involving land. 
The onus placed upon buyers to investigate the nature or quality of 
commodities and chattel arose in the case of Renton v. Maryott.14  A 
mortgagee sold the shares of a mining company to a mortgagor for 
$1,000.15  During the course of the transaction, the mortgagee represented 
that he had paid $1,000 for the shares of stock, which ultimately turned 
out to be worthless.16  The Court held, “[t]he rule of caveat emptor applies 
as well to the sale of stocks as of chattels.”17  The exception to this “rule” 
was that the vendor would only be found liable for misrepresentations or 
fraud.18 
Historically, New Jersey Courts required the complainant to 
 
 8  Mason v. Evans, 1 N.J.L. 182, 182 (1793). 
 9  Id. at 189. 
 10  Id. 
 11  Journey v. Hunt, 1 N.J.L. 235, 235 (1794).  
 12  Id. at 237. 
 13  Id. (citations omitted). 
 14  Renton v. Maryott, 21 N.J. Eq. 123, 123 (1870). 
 15  Id.  Adjusted for inflation $1,000 in 1870 is the equivalent of $17,997.91 in 2017.  See 
Inflation Calculator, OFFICIALDATA.ORG, http://www.in2013dollars.com/1870-dollars-in-
2017?amount=1000 (last visited May 10, 2018). 
 16  Renton, 21 N.J. Eq. at 124.  
 17  Id.  
 18  Id. 
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specifically plead fraud, misrepresentation, or deceit.19  In addition, the 
complainant was required to set forth specific damages in their 
complaint.20  Where a party failed to articulate, with specificity, the 
circumstances of the fraud and misrepresentation, the dismissal of the 
cause or the reversal of the judgment was frequently the result.21  
Lawsuits based on misrepresentation or fraud were often difficult and 
expensive for the consumer to prove.22  Frequently, the expense of 
pursuing a fraud claim far outweighed the damage award for the 
successful prosecution of such a claim.23  In the early part of 1870, the 
United States Congress began a movement toward consumer protection. 
B. The Mail Fraud Act of 1872 
The Mail Fraud Act24 was one of the earliest consumer protection 
statutes promulgated by the United States government.  During the 
debate, Representative Farnsworth identified the villains whose 
predatory behavior the Mail Fraud Act was designed to curtail.25  In his 
opinion, the mail fraud statute was essential “to prevent the frauds which 
are mostly gotten up in the large cities . . . by thieves, forgers and 
rapscallions generally, for the purpose of deceiving and fleecing the 
innocent people in the country.”26  In an effort to deter fraudulent 
behavior, the Mail Fraud Act made it a misdemeanor to effectuate a 
“scheme or artifice to defraud” another by means of “the post-office 
establishment of the United States.”27  If found guilty of violating the 
Mail Fraud Act, the perpetrator faced up to a $500 fine and up to eighteen 
calendar months in prison.28  Ne’er-do-wells who utilized the postal 
system to perpetrate their frauds were not the only individuals gaining the 
attention of the federal government and the public. 
C. The Bureau of Corporations 
On February 14, 1903, President Theodore Roosevelt created the 
 
 19  Lummis v. Stratton, 2 N.J.L. 229, 230 (1807).  
 20  Id. 
 21  Sexton v. Cramer, 3 N.J.L. 908, 908 (1811).  
 22  See Mason v. Evans, 1 N.J.L. 182, 184-85 (1793). 
 23  Id.  See DEE PRIDGEN & RICHARD M. ALDERMAN, CONSUMER PROTECTION AND THE 
LAW § 10:1 (2013); see also Jason M. Solomon, Judging Plaintiffs, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1749, 
1766-67 (2007).  See also infra Section II.D., for a discussion on the economic impact of the 
New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act. 
 24  Act of June. 8, 1872, ch. 335, 17 Stat. 323 (1872). 
 25  McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 356 (1987). 
 26  CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. 35 (1870) (remarks of Representative Farnsworth).  
 27  Act of June. 8, 1872, ch. 335, 17 Stat. 323 (1872). 
 28  Id. 
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Bureau of Corporations.29  The Bureau had the far-reaching power to 
make “diligent investigation into the organization, conduct and 
management of the business of any corporation, joint stock company or 
corporate combination engaged in commerce among the several States”30 
and to inspect the corporate ledgers of all companies engaged in interstate 
commerce.31  During the course of their investigation, the Bureau could 
“subpoena and compel the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the 
production of documentary evidence and to administer oaths.”32  
Information concerning corporations engaged in interstate, intrastate or 
foreign commerce would then be gathered, compiled and published by 
the Bureau.  The information gathered by the Bureau of Corporations was 
designed to “enable the President of the United States to make 
recommendations to Congress for legislation [to] 
regulat[e]. . .commerce.”33  This entity would serve as the predecessor to 
the Federal Trade Commission.34 
D. The Jungle 
In 1905, author Upton Sinclair serialized the disturbing experience 
of a Lithuanian immigrant living in Chicago and working in the 
meatpacking industry.  These articles were published in the Socialist 
magazine “Appeal to Reason.”35  The installments were eventually 
collected and published as a book published under the name, The Jungle.  
In addition to detailing the horrific working conditions endured by the 
meatpacking workers, the book also set forth what can conservatively be 
described as “grotesque descriptions” of the contaminated food produced 
by this then unregulated industry.36 
The original point of Sinclair’s exposé was to bring the 
dehumanization of workers and the brutal treatment of animals to the 
public’s attention.37  The readers, however, chose to focus on the health 
risks associated with unsanitary stockyards and meatpacking facilities.38  
Shortly after the book was published, the White House received “100 
 
 29  An Act to Establish the Department of Commerce and Labor, ch. 548, § 6 (1903).  
 30  Id. 
 31  Id. 
 32  Id. 
 33  Id. 
 34  Id.  For a discussion of the Federal Trade Commission, see infra Section E. 
 35  Daniel E. Slotnik, Upton Sinclair, Whose Muckraking Changed the Meat Industry, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/projects/cp/obituaries/arc 
hives/upton-sinclair-meat-industry. 
 36  Id. 
 37  Id. 
 38  Id. 
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letters a day demanding a Federal cleanup of the meat industry.”39  The 
outrage of the American citizenry, ignited by the investigative journalism 
of The Jungle, is often credited with being the impetus for the creation of 
the Food & Drug Administration.40 
To say that Upton Sinclair had gained the attention of the President 
of the United States is an understatement.  The two gentlemen frequently 
exchanged correspondence.  The issues set forth in The Jungle were 
among the topics that Upton Sinclair discussed with President Theodore 
Roosevelt.41  Alarmed by the book’s content, as well as the allegations 
set forth in Sinclair’s correspondence, the President was compelled to 
declare that, “the specific evils you point out shall, if their existence be 
proved, and if I have power, be eradicated.”  With that letter, the 
executive branch of government began what would be a long-standing 
commitment to combatting socio-economic evil in the marketplace. 
E. The Federal Trade Commission 
The Bureau of Corporations served as the predecessor to the Federal 
Trade Commission.42  An act to create the Federal Trade Commission, to 
define its powers and duties, was enacted on September 26, 1914.43  The 
Act authorized the President to appoint, with the advice and consent of 
the Senate, a bipartisan commission consisting of five commissioners.44  
Since Franklin D. Roosevelt symbolically set the cornerstone of the 
Commission’s headquarters, the Federal Trade Commission (“F.T.C.”) 
has maintained the unique dual missions of protecting consumers through 
the prohibition of unfair methods and promoting competition in interstate 
commerce.45  During the early part of the Twentieth Century, Congress 
was primarily concerned with corporate monopolies.  The F.T.C.’s 
mandate was to regulate “unfair methods of competition.”46  This goal 
rests solely within the domain of the F.T.C., because the Act did not 
 
 39  Id. (quoting Alden Whitman, author of Sinclair’s obituary).  
 40  Spencer Weber Waller, Jillian G. Brady & R.J. Acosta, Consumer Protection in the 
United States: An Overview, EUR. J. OF CONSUMER L., May 2011, at 1. 
 41  Letter from Upton Sinclar, Author, to Theodore Roosevelt, U.S. President (March 10, 
1906), (on file at Records of the Office of the Secretary of Agriculture). 
 42  Our History, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/our-history (last 
visited May 10, 2018); see also supra Section C.  
 43  An Act to Create a Federal Trade Commission, to Define its Powers and Duties, and 
for other purposes, ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717  (1914). 
 44  Id. at § 1. 
 45  What We Do, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do (last 
visited May 10, 2018). 
 46  Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717, 719 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 
45). 
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provide for private actions.47  The limits of the F.T.C.’s authority would 
not go unnoticed by the United States Supreme Court. 
In 1931, the Raladam Company manufactured and distributed a 
concoction known as “Marmola” to wholesalers, retailers and ultimately 
consumers.48  This product, which was to be ingested by its purchaser, 
was marketed as an “obesity cure.”49  Advertisements for this product 
were circulated in the United States.50  These advertisements, as well as 
the printed labels, specified that “the preparation [was] of scientific 
research, knowledge, and accuracy,” and “that it is safe and effective and 
may be used without discomfort, inconvenience, or danger or harmful 
results to health.”51  The F.T.C., under section 5 of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act,52 issued a complaint against the Raladam Company 
charging them with unfair methods of competition in interstate 
commerce.53  The F.T.C. ordered the Raladam Company to “cease and 
desist” from representing its “obesity cure” as a scientifically tested 
method for treating and curing obesity.54  Further, the F.T.C. ordered that 
statements regarding this “cure” could not be made, unless accompanied 
by a statement that it could not be taken safely except under medical 
direction.55  The Raladam Company, disquieted by the decision of the 
F.T.C., appealed the order of injunction.56 
The Court of Appeals was then called upon, by Raladam, to review 
the action of the Commission.57  After reviewing the action, the court 
reversed the injunction issued by the F.T.C.58  The Supreme Court 
granted certiorari and dealt solely with the issue of jurisdiction.59  The 
Supreme Court held that the Commission’s authority to issue a final order 
to “cease and desist” is predicated upon the existence of “competition.”60  
In affirming the decision of the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court 
 
 47  The enumeration of private actions under state consumer protection statutes, serves as 
a primary distinction between the F.T.C. Act and Consumer Protection Acts (CPAs). 
 48  DEAN K FUEROGHNE, LAW & ADVERTISING: A GUIDE TO CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES 39 
(2017). 
 49  F.T.C. v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 644 (1931). 
 50  Id. at 645. 
 51  Id. 
 52  Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717, 719 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 
45). 
 53  Raladam, 283 U.S. at 644. 
 54  Id.  
 55  Id. 
 56  Id. at 646.  
 57  Id.  
 58  Id. 
 59  Raladam, 283 U.S. at 646. 
 60  Id. at 654. 
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warned the F.T.C. that it could not give itself jurisdiction to make such 
an order if none existed.61  The Court concluded, “if . . . it turn[s] out that 
the preliminary assumption of competition is without foundation, 
jurisdiction to make [a final cease and desist order] necessarily fails, and 
the proceeding must be dismissed by the Commission.”62  Thus, it was 
clear to the F.T.C., and to merchants, that the Supreme Court of the 
United States would not extend the powers of the F.T.C. beyond those 
enacted by Congress.  In the years that followed, the decision of the Court 
would be the subject of discussion among the Commissioners. 
Heretofore, the F.T.C.’s power was limited to curtailing corporate 
practices that unfairly affected competition in the marketplace among 
businesses.  In 1935, however, the Commission sought, “clear 
jurisdiction over a practice which is unfair or deceptive to the public” 
even if this practice did not affect a competitor.63  The Commission noted 
that, “[t]here are times when [an unfair or deceptive] practice is so 
universal in an industry that the public is primarily injured rather than 
individual competitors.  In such cases it is very difficult, if not impossible, 
to show injury to competitors, but the injury to the public is manifest.”  
The Annual Report issued by the F.T.C. recommended a modification to 
section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. The proposed 
amendment sought to extend the powers of the F.T.C., “. . . so as to 
specifically prohibit not only unfair methods of competition in commerce 
but also unfair or deceptive acts and practices in commerce.”64  The 
F.T.C.’s recommendation to expand its authority, eventually adopted by 
Congress,65 would serve as the basis for modern consumer protection 
law.66  Before the F.T.C. would be vested with this authority, the Supreme 
Court would be asked to examine yet another “cease and desist” order 
issued by the Commission. 
After service of a complaint, and extensive hearings, the F.T.C. 
made findings of fact from testimony and ordered the Standard Education 
 
 61  Id. 
 62  Id.  See generally F.T.C. v. Raladam Co., 316 U.S. 149 (1945) (affirming an injunction 
against Raladam and holding that the F.T.C. “found with meticulous particularity” that 
Raladam had made many misleading and deceptive statements which had the “tendency and 
capacity” to induce people to purchase their product in preference and to the exclusion of 
products of competitors). 
 63  AN. REP. OF THE FED. TRADE COMM’N FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30 1935 15 
(1935), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports_annual/annual-report-193 
5/ ar1935_0.pdf .  
 64  Id.  
 65  Wheeler-Lea Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-447, § 3, 52 Stat. 111, 111 (1938) (codified 
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) 2000)).  
 66  Victor E. Shwartz & Cary Silverman, Common Sense Construction of Consumer 
Protection Acts, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 8 (2005). 
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Society to “cease and desist” from certain practices used in furthering the 
sales of books in interstate commerce.67  The Commission made specific 
findings that the defendant’s practices were “unfair, false, deceptive and 
misleading.”68  The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 
however, both modified and weakened the Commission’s Order 
concluding, 
we cannot take too seriously the suggestion that a man who 
is buying a set of books and a ten years’ extension service 
will be fatuous enough to be misled by the mere statement 
that they are given away, and that he is paying only for the 
second.  Such trivial niceties are to impalpable for practical 
affairs, they are will-o’-the wisps, which divert attention from 
substantial evils.69 
By this time, both the executive and legislative branches of government 
had embraced the concept of consumer protection.  In 1937, the decision 
of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit would force the 
F.T.C. to bring the issue of consumer protection directly to the Supreme 
Court of the United States. 
Upon application by the F.T.C., the Supreme Court of the United 
States granted certiorari.70  After reviewing the holding of the Court of 
Appeals, Justice Black, delivering the opinion of the court, stated, 
[t]he fact that a false statement may be obviously false to 
those who are trained and experienced does not change its 
character, nor take away its power to deceive others less 
experienced.  There is no duty resting upon a citizen to 
suspect the honesty of those with whom he transacts business.  
Laws are made to protect the trusting as well as the 
suspicious.  The best element of business has long since 
decided that honesty should govern competitive enterprises, 
and that the rule of caveat emptor should not be relied upon 
to reward fraud and deception. 
This holding cautioned that unsavory business practices would not be 
tolerated in this Country.  One year later, that statement would “apply 
with even greater force.”71  In 1938, Congress passed the Wheeler-Lea 
Act, which proscribed “unfair or deceptive acts or practices” as well as 
“unfair methods of competition.”72 
The Wheeler-Lea Act strengthened the power of the F.T.C. to fight 
“unfair or deceptive acts or practices” employed by unscrupulous 
 
 67  F.T.C. v. Standard Educ. Soc., 58 U.S. 113, 113 (1937). 
 68  Id. 
 69  Id. 
 70  Id.  
 71  R.E. Freer, Commissioner, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Address before the An. Convention 
of the Proprietary Ass’n: The Wheeler Act (May 17, 1938).  
 72  Wheeler-Lea Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-447, §3, 52 Stat. 111, 111 (1938) (codified 
as amended at 15 U.S.C. §45(a) 2000)). 
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merchants.73  Congress appears to have purposely left these terms without 
clear definitions.  Rather than attempting to undertake the endless task of 
enumerating these prohibited acts, Congress decided to “leave it to the 
commission to determine what practices were unfair.”74  In vesting the 
Commission with this superpower, Congress expected the Commission’s 
members would “possess substantial business and commercial 
backgrounds,” enabling them to distinguish “malevolent business 
practices harming consumers from disingenuous claims of ‘unfairness’ 
prompted only by consumer litigation.”75  The F.T.C., strengthened by 
the Wheeler-Lea Act, initially enjoyed tremendous popularity. 
In time, the popularity of the F.T.C. would wane and the 
Commission would not be without its detractors.76  By the middle of the 
twentieth century the F.T.C. was seen by some as, “. . . rudderless; poorly 
managed and poorly staffed; obsessed with trivia; politicized; all in all, 
inefficient and incompetent.”77  In addition, there was a growing 
frustration among consumers with common law causes of action.78  These 
critics, however, did not quell what amounted to a popular demand for 
consumer protection and business regulation.79  The convergence of these 
three forces would lead states to enact their own Consumer Protection 
Acts.80 
II. THE MODERN CONSUMER PROTECTION MOVEMENT 
A. The Post-War Economy 
After “three years, eight months, and twenty-two days,” World War 
 
 73  See generally Id. at § 5; see also Shwartz & Silverman, supra note 66. 
 74  Shwartz & Silverman, supra note 66.  
 75  See Shepherd, supra note 7, at 5. 
 76  See Richard Posner, The Federal Trade Commission, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 47, 47 n.1 
(1969) (citing GERARD C. HENDERSON, THE FED. TRADE COMM’N: A STUDY IN ADMIN. L. AND 
PROC. (1924); COMM’N ON ORG. OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF GOV., TASK FORCE ON REG. 
COMM’NS Appendix N (1949); J. LANDIS, REPORT ON REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE 
PRESIDENT ELECT (1960); Auerbach, The Federal Trade Commission: Internal Organization 
and Procedure, 48 MINN L. REV. 383, 383 (1964); E. COX, R. FELLMETH & J. SCHULZ, THE 
CONSUMER AND THE FED. TRADE COMM’N (1969), reprinted in 115 CONG. REC. E. 370 (daily 
ed. Jan. 22, 1969); REP. OF THE ABA COMM’N TO STUDY THE FED. TRADE COMM’N (1969)).  
See also FED. TRADE COMM’N MGMT. SURV. REP. OF ROBERT HELLER & ASSOCIATES, INC. 
(1954); U.S. CIV. SERV. COMM’N, EVALUATION OF PERSONNEL (1965).  Memorandum from 
Philip Elman, F.T.C. Chairman on Admin. Reform, Fed. Trade Comm’n, to the Chairman of 
the Senate Subcommittee on Admin. Practice and Procedure. 
 77  Posner, supra note 76, at 47. 
 78  Henry N. Butler & Joshua Wright, Are State Consumer Protection Acts Really Little-
FTC Acts?, 63 FLA. L. REV. 163, 167 (2011). 
 79  Id.  
 80  Id. 
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II ended for the United States.81  Domestically, the 1950s and 1960s were 
marked by rapid acceleration toward a “consumer-oriented society.”82  
The post-war era ushered in products and services that were becoming 
increasingly complex.83  Local merchants began to give way to large-
scale business organizations.84  As the marketplace grew, so too did the 
level of impersonal interactions between the merchant and the 
consumer.85  Traditional consumer transactions, formerly resplendent 
with “good will” and “mutual acquaintance,” gave way to adhesion 
contracts and the rise of “deceptive trade practices, poor service and 
shoddy merchandise.”86 
When left unchecked either by the corporate entity or by the 
executive branch, unscrupulous merchants “generally discovered that 
they [could] impose upon consumers the cost of their own laxity, ‘sharp 
trading’ or conscious deception because they [were] not adequately 
disciplined by loss of good will in sales or by threat of effective legal 
remedy from their customers.”87  These laissez faire attitudes toward 
consumers would not, however, enjoy the longevity that caveat emptor 
enjoyed during the prior two centuries. 
B. New Jersey—Consumer “Liberty and Prosperity”88 
In a flourishing post-war economy Americans came to believe that 
they were entitled to “. . . a good life of material plenty, comfort, safety 
and security.”89  As America moved into the 1960s, a portion of the 
population began to experience a cultural awakening.  During the 1960s 
and 1970s, “quality-of-life” issues would become the focus of 
governmental regulation.90  In an attempt to combat injustice, the federal 
 
 81  World War II, U.S. HISTORY, http://www.u-s-history.com/pages/h1661.html (last 
visited May 10, 2018).  
 82  J.R. Franke & D.A. Ballam, New Applications of Consumer Protection Law: Judicial 
Activism or Legislative Directive?, 32 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 347, 354 (1992). 
 83  Kugler v. Romain, 58 N.J. 522, 535 (1971) (noting that there can be no doubt, in 
today’s society, sale of consumer goods, especially on an installment credit basis, has become 
a matter of ever-increasing state of national anxiety); see also Shepherd, supra note 7, at 7. 
 84  William A. Lovett, State Deceptive Trade Practice Legislation, 46 TUL. L. REV. 724, 
725 (1971). 
 85  Id. 
 86  Id. 
 87  Id. at 726.  
 88  Adopted in 1777, “Liberty and Prosperity” is the motto of the State of New Jersey.  
See also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:2-1(a) (West 1992). 
 89  Franke & Ballam, supra note 82, at 355.  See generally MANSEL G. BLACKFORD & K. 
AUSTIN KERR, BUS. ENTERPRISE IN AM. HIST. 12-17 (1986). 
 90  Franke & Ballam, supra note 82, at 355. 
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government began to focus on issues such as: environmentalism,91 civil 
rights,92 occupational safety,93 and consumer protection.  States, such as 
New Jersey, started to focus on these pressing social issues. 
In 1960, the New Jersey marketplace was rife with fraudulent 
practices.94  The dubious behavior of merchants did not escape the 
attention of the legislative branch of New Jersey’s government.  In 
response to consumer complaints, and in an attempt to quell fraudulent 
commercial practices, eleven senators moved a groundbreaking piece of 
legislation by way of an emergency resolution.95  The situation was so 
dire that on April 11, 1960, New Jersey Senator John A. Waddington, 
along with ten fellow senators96 introduced S199, “An Act Concerning 
Consumer Fraud, its Prevention, and Providing Penalties Therefor.”97  
The Senate passed this legislation on May 9, 1960.98  Seven days after 
passage in the Senate, the Assembly passed this emergency legislation.99  
By the late spring of 1960, the legal principle of caveat emptor, which 
previously placed the onus on the consumer to check the quality and 
suitability of goods before making a purchase, was no longer welcome in 
the Garden State.  With the signature of Governor Robert B. Meyner, on 
June 9, 1960, New Jersey became one of the first states in the country to 
enact a consumer protection statute.100 
C. New Jersey’s Consumer Fraud Act of 1960 
Born from emergency legislation, the New Jersey Consumer Fraud 
Act (“NJCFA” or the “Act”) contained only twelve sections.101  The 
 
 91  See generally RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (2002). 
 92  See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964). 
 93  See Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (1970).   
 94  Furst v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 182 N.J. 1, 11 (2004) (citing Cox v. Sears Roebuck & 
Co., 138 N.J. 2, 21 (1994)). 
 95  Id. 
 96  Sponsors for this consumer protection legislation included: Senators Donal Fox, 
Thomas F. Connery, John A. Lynch, Anthony Grossi, Sido L. Ridolfi, Walter H. Jones, 
Wesley L. Lance, Wayne Dumont, Jr., Robert Crane and William E. Ozzard. 
 97  Legislative History of R.S. 56:8-1 through 14 (March 17, 1971).  It should be noted 
that history surrounding the passage of this Act is scant to non-existent.  According to a 
handwritten note contained in the legislative history, the Governor’s statement on enacting 
this legislation is “[n]ot in bound bills.  Not with the histories for c. 40 & c. 41 (signed at the 
same time).  NJ Documents has no press releases for 1960.”  
 98  Id. 
 99  Id. 
 100  Consumer Fraud Act, ch. 39, §§ 1-12, 1960 NJ Laws 137 (codified as amended at N.J. 
Rev. Stat. §§ 56:8-1 to 56:8-195 (2016). 
 101  Id. § 13 ( “This act shall take effect immediately[.]”). 
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NJCFA defined five terms: advertisement,102 Attorney General,103 
merchandise,104 person,105 and sale.106  These terms form the foundation 
of the NJCFA.107  Despite its diminutive size, the purpose of the Act was 
clear: 
[t]he purpose of this bill is to permit the Attorney General to 
combat the increasingly widespread practice of defrauding 
the public.  The Authority conferred will provide effective 
machinery to investigate and prohibit deceptive and 
fraudulent advertising and selling practices which have 
caused extensive damage to the public.108 
Absent from the statutory schema was the right of a private individual to 
enforce violations of the Act.  The NJFTC emulated the F.T.C.’s focus 
on preventing consumer fraud, providing restitution to victims and 
establishing the Attorney General as the chief law enforcement officer 
responsible for enforcing the Act.109 
The NJFTC vested the New Jersey Attorney General with sole 
authority to investigate alleged violations of the newly minted consumer 
fraud laws.110  The Legislature imbued the Attorney General with the 
statutory tools necessary to protect consumers.  To detect and quash 
devious merchants, the Attorney General now had the power to require a 
person to issue a written statement under oath,111 examine under oath any 
person in connection with a questioned transaction,112 and examine and 
even impound merchandise, records, books, documents, accounts or 
papers.113  Further, to accomplish the objectives and carry out the duties 
prescribed by the Act, the Attorney General was granted the power to 
“issue subpoenas to any person, administer an oath . . . and conduct 
hearings in aid of any investigation.”114  Finally, the Legislature granted 
the Attorney General the greatest superpower of all, the ability to 
 
 102  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-1(a) (West 1960). 
 103  Id. at § 56:8-1(b). 
 104  Id. at § 56:8-1(c). 
 105  Id. at § 56:8-1(d). 
 106  Id. at § 56:8-1(e). 
 107  Over the next fifty-five years the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act would come to 
include a total of 254 statutes, 30 of which would define an additional 186 terms.  These 
additional “definitions” frequently define the same term in multiple sections of the NJCFA.  
See infra Sections on treatment of definitions sections. 
 108  Kugler v. Banner Pontiac-Buick, Opel, Inc., 120 N.J. Super. 572, 577 (N.J. Ch. Div. 
1972). 
 109  See Shepherd, supra note 7, at 6; see also Consumer Fraud Act, ch. 39, §§1-12, 1960 
NJ Laws 137 (codified as amended at N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 56:8-1 to 56:8-148 (2010)). 
 110  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-3 (West 1960).  
 111  Id. at § 56:8-3(a). 
 112  Id. at § 56:8-3(b). 
 113  Id. at § 56:8-3(c)(d). 
 114  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-4 (West 1960). 
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“promulgate such rules and regulations[,] which shall have the force of 
law.”115  The authority to stamp out villainy in the marketplace had one 
limitation; it had to be exercised to benefit the “public interest.”116  The 
state’s chief law enforcement officer would not neglect the exercise of 
this power. 
The codification of all rules and regulations made by the executive 
branch, or its agencies, can be found in the New Jersey Administrative 
Code (NJAC).  Pursuant to the authority granted to the Attorney General 
under the NJCFA, detailed and extensive regulations have been adopted 
that govern both the sale of goods and the advertising practices of 
merchants in the area of consumer sales.117  Although not adopted all at 
once, the NJAC has gradually expanded to encompass twenty-seven 
titles.118  For example, Title 13 addresses issues of law and public 
safety.119  Within Title 13, Chapter 45A contains 258 code sections and 
spans 266 pages setting forth the rules administered by the Division of 
Consumer Affairs.120 
Seven years after its enactment, an additional power was bestowed 
upon the Attorney General.121  Once in receipt of evidence that a 
provision of the NJCFA had been violated, the Attorney General was “. . . 
empowered to hold hearings upon said violation and upon finding the 
violation to have been committed, to assess a penalty against the person 
alleged to have committed such violation[.]”122  Even to the most obtuse 
merchant, there was little question at the time that the Legislature 
intended to confer upon the Attorney General “the broadest kind of power 
to act in the interest of the consumer public.”123  What merchants might 
not have expected was the expansion of the NJCFA to include what 




 115  Id. 
 116  § 56:8-3.   
 117  See generally N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 13:45A-1.1 (LEXIS 2018). 
 118  Id.; see also N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 1:1–9:67 (LEXIS 2018). 
 119   § 13:45A-1.1. 
 120  Id. 
 121  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-3.1 (West 1967).  
 122  Id.  
 123  Kugler v. Romain, 58 N.J. 522, 537 (1971).  
 124  Lemellendo v. Beneficial Mgmt. Corp. of Am., 150 N.J. 255, 268 (1997).  Cf. Agency 
Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assoc., 483 U.S. 143, 151 (1987) (“both statutes bring to 
bear the pressure of ‘private attorneys general’ on a serious national problem for which public 
prosecutorial resources are deemed inadequate; the mechanism chose to reach the 
objective . . . is the carrot of treble damages.”).  
SILVER 2018 
2018] HERO OR VILLAIN 249 
D. The “Me Decade” and Caveat Venditor—”Let the Seller 
Beware” 
By 1971, the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act suffered from three 
problems.  First, after eleven years, the authority to enforce the New 
Jersey Consumer Fraud Act had remained solely within the Office of the 
Attorney General.  The resources of the executive branch were not 
unlimited and the Attorney General could not prosecute every case.125  
Second, an aggrieved individual was free to initiate a private cause of 
action against a disreputable merchant.  Under this schema, however, a 
consumer was left with the arduous task of pleading, and ultimately 
proving, common-law fraud causes of action against a seller.  Third, in 
many cases, the consumers’ claims were so small, the expense of hiring 
an attorney so great and the legal requirements so complex that they 
would simply abandon their claims.126  In 1971, proposed modifications 
to the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act were sought to ameliorate each 
of these obstacles to consumer protection. 
The Attorney General supported the proposed amendments to the 
New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act.127  Attorney General Kugler directed a 
letter to the Senators who supported the changes to the NJCFA.  In his 
letter, the Attorney General advised the Senators regarding what he 
believed to be the most significant aspects of the proposed legislation: 
[P]erhaps one of the most substantial and necessary remedies 
provided by this legislation grants the consumer a private 
right of action against persons violating the Consumer Fraud 
Act. In addition, the provision mandates treble damages, 
reasonable attorneys’ fees and reasonable costs of suit in such 
an action.128 
The Attorney General also stressed the socio-economic importance of the 
proposed damage provisions: 
[W]e found through our study that consumers are often 
without adequate remedy for redressing violations such as 
those contained in the Consumer Fraud Act.  In addition, we 
found that consumers most often cannot afford the cost of 
pursuing what remedies they do have available and that 
attorneys are not generally attracted to individual consumer 
suits which involve a great amount of work and very little 
monetary award.  Consequently, we included the above 
private right of action in order to provide a vehicle for private 
consumer redress, to make that vehicle economically feasible 
 
 125  See Gonzalez v. Wilshire Credit Corp., 207 N.J. 557, 557 (2011). 
 126  Henry N. Butler & Jason S. Johnston, Consumer Harm Acts? An Economic Analysis 
of Private Actions Under State Consumer Protection Acts 2 (Nw. U. Sch. of L., Working 
Paper No. 184, 2009).See also Skeer v. EMK Motors, Inc., 187 N.J. Super. 465, 512 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1982) (discussing the cost of private litigation of consumer complaints). 
 127  Skeer, 187 N.J. Super. at 472. 
 128  Id. at 473. 
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to the private consumer and to make it economically and 
professionally attractive to the attorneys of this State. 
With the foresight and cooperation of the Legislature, these 
recommendations became a reality.129 
On June 21, 1971, Governor William T. Cahill enacted legislation 
that gave New Jersey one of the strongest consumer protection laws in 
the nation.130  The modifications to the NJCFA were specifically designed 
to “provide increased protection for consumers.”131  The Governor’s 
message heralded the newest modifications to the consumer protection 
statute.  In addition, the Governor’s press release, although not 
considered part of the Act’s legislative history, confirms the unwavering 
support of the executive branch for the Act that made New Jersey a leader 
in consumer protection law.132 
The 1971 amendments broadened the definition of consumer fraud, 
streamlined enforcement procedures and increased the penalties for 
violations of the Act.133  In passing upon the efficacy of the newly enacted 
statutes, the Governor recognized that “. . . this bill coupled with recent 
legislation, which created a new Division of Consumer Affairs gives New 
Jersey the enforcement power it needs to protect the consumer.”134  With 
this new grant of authority, the Attorney General now had the ability to 
seek restitution of money or property for a defrauded consumer.135  In 
addition, the Legislature empowered the Attorney General, 
to enjoin the ownership or management of businesses used 
for unlawful practices and after a hearing to order that money 
acquired by unlawful means be restored to the consumer. The 
bill also provides that the Attorney General have hearing 
orders which are ignored, filed with the court as a judgment 
thus avoiding the need for further hearing or trial.136 
The Legislature did not limit the authority to combat consumer fraud to 
the Attorney General.  According to the Governor, this consumer 
protection juggernaut expanded the NJCFA and authorized private 
citizens to file actions against merchants alleging a violation of the 
Consumer Fraud Act.137 
Simply amending the NJCFA to provide a consumer with a private 
 
 129  Id. at 471. 
 130  Id. 
 131  Id. at 473. 
 132  See id. at 472 (discussing the meager legislative history and the fact that no hearing or 
committee reports are available regarding the passage of these amendments). 
 133  Skeer, 187 N.J. Super. at 472.  N.J. STAT. ANN. 56:8-1 to 56:8-1-20 (West 1971). 
 134  Skeer, 187 N.J. Super. at 471. 
 135  Id. 
 136  Id. at 472. 
 137  Id. 
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cause of action against a merchant would not have dramatically altered 
the consumer protection landscape.  For the previous two centuries, an 
aggrieved consumer was permitted to file a lawsuit against a merchant.  
This, however, was not always a practical solution to a very real 
problem.138  The poor and the powerless needed someone to champion 
their causes of action.  The NJCFA was enacted to fill that void.139  The 
ability to seek treble damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees, and reasonable 
costs of suit would have a threefold effect on the consumer.140  Fee 
awards would, “. . . provide easier access to the courts for the 
consumer . . . increase the attractiveness of consumer actions to attorneys 
and . . . help reduce the burdens on the Division of Consumer Affairs.”141  
These remedies “reflect an apparent legislative intent to enlarge [the] 
fraud-fighting authority [of the Act] and to delegate that authority among 
various governmental and nongovernmental entities, each exercising 
different forms of remedial power.”142 
Consumer-plaintiffs would not be the only ones to feel the impact of 
the amendments to the NJCFA.  The punitive aspects of the Act were, by 
design, meant to leave a lasting impression on the unprincipled merchants 
and serve as a warning to others.  The treble damage, fee-shifting and cost 
of suit provisions were calculated to “. . . punish the wrongdoer and to 
deter others from engaging in similar practices.”143  The judiciary’s 
liberal interpretation of the Act, specifically regarding the attorneys’ fees, 
would have a secondary effect on merchants.  The award of attorney’s 
fees would, “attract competent counsel to counteract the ‘community 
scourge’ of fraud by providing an incentive for an attorney to take a case 
involving a minor loss to the individual.”144  By 1971, consumers were 
equipped with the tools necessary to level the playing field with 
merchants and, for the most part, they did. 
E. “To Infinity, and Beyond?”145 
After almost 200 years of being alone in the marketplace, the 
passage of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act signaled a departure from 
the legal principle of caveat emptor (“buyer beware”).  In just over ten 
years after the NJCFA was enacted, the 1971 amendments to the Act 
 
 138  See id. (discussing the cost of private litigation and consumer complaints). 
 139  Gonzalez v. Wilshire Credit, 207 N.J. 557, 585 (2011).  
 140  Skeer, 187 N.J. Super. at 472. 
 141  Id. 
 142  Gonzalez, 207 N.J. at 585.  
 143  Id. (emphasis added). 
 144  Sprenger v. Trout and Bridgeton Spring & Welding, 375 N.J. Super. 120 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 2005) (citing Lettenmaier v. Lube Connection, Inc., 162 N.J. 134, 139 (1999)). 
 145  TOY STORY (Walt Disney Pictures 1995). 
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dramatically changed the dynamic in commercial transactions.  These 
amendments ushered in an era of caveat venditor, “seller beware.”  The 
actions of all three branches of government put merchants on notice that 
unscrupulous business practices would no longer be tolerated in New 
Jersey. 
The social norms and the needs of a society may change gradually, 
or dramatically, over time.  Changes in morality, ethics, technology, or 
even catastrophic events bring to the fore the necessity of codifying new 
laws or modifying the existing laws.146  Although the laws that influence 
social behavior have the ability to change norms over time, they too may 
require alterations to address societal changes.147  The New Jersey 
Consumer Fraud Act is not impervious to the need for change. 
Originally enacted to combat “sharp practices and dealings” that 
preyed upon unknowing consumers by enticing them to purchase goods 
or services through deceptive means,148 the Act, by its very nature, is 
considered remedial legislation.  To achieve the goal of the NJCFA, 
Courts have resisted any effort “to import into the [NJ]CFA obstacles that 
would impede access to the broad remedial protections for consumers that 
our Legislature so obviously intended to create.”149  The consumer 
protections set forth in the 1971 amendments are substantial.  They would 
not, however, be the only changes made to the NJCFA by the legislature. 
As noted previously, New Jersey’s “Act Concerning Consumer 
Fraud, its Prevention, and Providing Penalties Therefore” was original set 
forth in one chapter.150  It was never the intention of the drafters to set 
forth every prohibited practice.151  In Lemelledo v. Beneficial 
Management Corp. of America, the defendant moved to dismiss the 
plaintiff’s class action lawsuit by arguing that the NJCFA, and its 
implementing regulations, did not specifically include a reference to 
insurance.152  In denying the defendant’s request for relief the Supreme 
Court explicitly acknowledged that the Act could never enumerate every 
 
 146  See What is Law Reform?, LAWGOVPOL, http://lawgovpol.com/what-is-law-reform/ 
(last visited May 10, 2018). 
 147  Clifton B. Parker, Laws May be Ineffective if They Don’t Reflect Social Norms, 
Stanford Scholar Says, STANFORD NEWS (Nov. 24, 2014), https://news.stanford.edu/news/201 
4/november/social-norms-jackson-112414.html. 
 148  Cox v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 138 N.J. 2, 2 (1994) (citing D’Ercole Sales, Inc. v. 
Fruehauf Corp., 206 N.J. Super. 11 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 1985)). 
 149  Boseland v. Warnock Dodge, Inc., 197 N.J. 543, 559 (2009).  For a comprehensive 
analysis of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act see PAUL DEPETRIS, N.J. CONSUMER FRAUD 
ACT & FORMS 9 (2017).  
 150  Consumer Fraud Act, ch. 39, §§1-12, 1960 NJ Laws 137 (codified as amended at N.J. 
REV. STAT. §§ 56:8-1 to 56:8-195 (2016). 
 151  See Lemelledo v. Benefical Mgmt. Corp. of Am., 150 N.J. 255, 265 (1997). 
 152  Id. 
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possible evil that it was created to combat.  The Court found: 
[t]he fertility of [human] invention in devising new schemes 
of fraud is so great . . . the CFA could not possibly enumerate 
all, or even most, of the areas and practices that it covers 
without severely retarding its broad remedial powers to root 
out fraud in its myriad, nefarious manifestations.153 
The Court also noted the futility of having the Legislature set forth each 
and every type of fraud in the Consumer Fraud Act.154  In doing so, the 
Court paid homage to the language of the holding in Federal Trade 
Comm’n v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co.,155 wherein the United States 
Supreme Court found that, 
[e]ven if all known unfair practices where specifically 
defined and prohibited, it would be at once necessary to begin 
[redrafting the list] again [,constituting] . . . an endless 
task.156 
Nevertheless, in an attempt to clarify the Act and define acceptable 
contemporary behavior between merchants and consumers, the New 
Jersey Legislature would add new provisions to the NJCFA. 
As originally enacted, the NJCFA contained twelve statutory 
provisions.157  Now, the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act contains 
twenty-eight, frequently undesignated, subchapters.158  Presently, there 
are 254 consumer protection statutes spanning 106 pages.159  While the 
text of the original Act contained only five definitions,160 it now contains 
thirty different definition sections that cover 186 terms.161  Figure 1 sets 
 
 153  Id. (citations omitted). 
 154  Id. 
 155  Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 240 (1972).  
 156  Id. at 240.  See Bosland v. Warnock Dodge, Inc. 197 N.J. 543, 556 (2009) (stating the 
judiciary will “construe the [CFA] broadly, not in a crabbed fashion.”). 
 157  Consumer Fraud Act, ch. 39, §§1-12, 1960 NJ Laws 137 (codified as amended at N.J. 
REV. STAT. §§ 56:8-1 to 56:8-195 (2016)). 
 158  N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-1 to 56:8-195 (West 2016). 
 159  Id. 
 160  N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-1(a)-(e) (West 1960). 
 161  See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-1 (West 1999); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-2.15 (West 1982); 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-2.29 (West 2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-14.2 (West 2017); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 56:8-22 (West 1975); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-39 (West 1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 56:8-49 (West 1991); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-53.1 (West 2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-55 
(West 1991); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-62 (West 1994); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-67 (West 1997); 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-83 (West 1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-86 (West 1998); N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 56:8-93 (West 2015); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-99 (West 2000); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-
104 (West 2000); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-108 (West 2001); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-110 (West 
2012); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-115 (West 2002); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-120 (West 2003); 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-130 (West 2015); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-137 (West 2014); N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 56:8-153 (West 2004); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-157 (West 2005); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 
56:8-161 (West 2005); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-170 (West 2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-175 
(West 2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-185 (West 2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-196 (West 
2014).  
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forth the 298 amendments to the NJCFA since it was enacted by the 
Legislature.162 
 
Figure 1: Amendments to the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act 
From 1966 through 2017. 
 
It should come as no surprise that the expansion of the Consumer 
Fraud Act to permit private causes of action, treble damages and 
attorneys’ fees contributed to the deluge of consumer protection 
litigation.163  Consumer actions in either tort or general litigation were 
outnumbered by private complaints filed pursuant to the New Jersey 
Consumer Fraud Act.  The increase in litigation from 2000 to 2009 
brought with it an increase in the number of reported consumer protection 
decisions.164  During the first decade of the twenty-first century, the 
number of reported decisions increased by 447 percent.165  Using 
published decisions as a milestone for measuring the amount of consumer 
protection litigation, New Jersey easily exceeded the national trend.166 
 
 162  The NJCFA Amendments were calculated by reviewing each statute, the date that the 
section was proposed and amended prior to or after enactment.  
 163  See Shepherd, supra note 7 (Regarded as a thoughtful treatment of the consequences 
of New Jersey’s expansion of the Consumer Fraud Act). 
 164  See Shepherd, supra note 7. 
 165  See Shepherd, supra note 7. 
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Figure 2: Trends in Consumer Protection Litigation 2000-2009; 
New Jersey versus the National Average. 
 
The increase in published opinions, supports the supposition that New 
Jersey enjoys one of the country’s strongest consumer protection acts in 
the country.  This approach, however, is not the only method to confirm 
that New Jersey leads the country in “pro-plaintiff” consumer laws. 
Developed in 2009, the Expected Value Index (EVI) serves as 
another method to determine the extent to which a statute is likely to 
encourage litigation.167  An act may contain a significant number of 
statutes that make it easier for a plaintiff to prevail in an action, thereby 
making it more likely a plaintiff will institute their lawsuit.  These types 
of Acts receive a high EVI score.  Between 2000 and 2013, New Jersey 
had the largest change in EVI of the states examined.168 
 
 
 167  JAMES C. COOPER & MATTHEW D. SIBERY, SEARLE CIV. JUST. INST., STATE CONSUMER 
PROTECTION ACT LITIGATION: UPDATES ON TRENDS 8 (2016). 
 168  Id. at 11. 
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Figure 3. Top EVI Growth: Without Definitional Changes.169 
 
Despite New Jersey’s high EVI score, in recent years it appears 
that a plateau has been reached.170  The New Jersey judiciary would have 
an opportunity to interpret Consumer Fraud Act in the years following its 
passage.  The judiciary would not be the only branch of government that 
would concern itself with various provisions of the Act. 
III. WHERE DOES THE LAW GO FROM HERE? 
A. The Structure of the Act. 
For over fifty years, the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act has 
been amended by the Legislature in an attempt to protect consumers.  In 
its current form, the Act looks radically different than it did when it was 
originally enacted by the Legislature.  The Act began with twelve statutes 
and now contains 195 sequentially numbered statutes set forth within 
twenty-eight frequently undesignated subchapters.171  When N.J.S.A. 
56:8-2 was originally enacted, it was titled, “Unlawful Practice.”172  In its 
current form, section two now contains thirty-two separate statutes and 
 
 169  Id. 
 170  Id. at 14. 
 171  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-1 to 56:8-195 (West 2016).  
 172  § 56:8-2.  
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two acts.173  At first blush, the statutes appear to have been added 
chronologically; the structure of the NJCFA, however, is not that simple. 
As substantive statutes were added to the Act, so too were statutes 
that sought to define the terms contained in the newly added code 
sections.  The Act now contains thirty separate and distinct definition 
statues that define 186 terms.174  These new sections frequently duplicate 
terms that have already been defined by the Act.  The term “director,” 
pertaining to the Director of the Division of Consumer Affairs in the 
Department of Law and Public Safety, is defined thirteen times in thirteen 
separate statutes within the Act.175  The presence of these duplicative 
definitions tends to make the Act cumbersome and difficult to navigate. 
To many, the arrangement of the Act is as confusing as it is 
redundant.  It may be beneficial to reorganize the Act to clarify confusing 
provisions and excise redundancies.  First, duplicative definitions could 
be eliminated in an effort to streamline and simplify the Act.176  
Additionally, sections of general applicability should be grouped 
together.177  Finally, rather than being set forth in a chronological order 
the statutes should be organized by subject matter.178 
Review of the statute by the New Jersey Law Revision 
Commission (“NJLRC” or “Commission”) has resulted in the 
consideration of revisions to the structure of the New Jersey Consumer 
Fraud Act as follows179: 
1. Generally applicable provisions 
a. Definitions.180 
 
 173  § 56-2 (including the “Refund Policy Disclosure Act of 1982” (N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-
2.14 (West 1982)) and the “Raincheck Policy Disclosure Act of 2006” (N.J. STAT. ANN. § 
56:8-2.28 (West 2006))). 
 174  See Shepherd, supra note 7.  
 175  See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-22 (West 1975); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-26 (West 2008); 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-39 (West 1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-49 (West 1991); N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 56:8-62 (West 1994); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-67 (West 1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-
86 (West 1998); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-93 (West 1999); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-99 (West 
2000); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-120 (2003); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-137 (West 2004); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. §  56:8-170 (West 2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-175 (West 2007); N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 56:8-185 (West 2009). 
 176  See Memorandum from Susan Thatch, to the New Jersey Law Rev. Comm. 4 (Mar. 9, 
2015).  
 177  Id. 
 178  Id. 
 179  Id. The proposed revisions represent the preliminary assessment of the statute 
performed by Susan Thatch.  See also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-2.4 (West 1973). 
 180  See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-1 (West 1960); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-2.15 (West 1982); 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-2.29 (West 2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-14.2 (West 1999); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 56:8-22 (West 1975); § 56:8-39; § 56:8-49; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-53.1 (West 
2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-55 (West 1991); § 56:8-62; § 56:8-67; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-
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b. General Fraud.181 
c. Remedies and Construction of the 
Act.182 
d. Attorney General’s Authority, 
Enforcement Powers, and 
Penalties.183 
e. Civil Cause of Action and 
Penalties.184 
f. Promulgation of Regulations.185 
g. Severability.186 
h. Educational Programs related to the 
CFA.187 
2. Merchandise 
a. Advertisement of Unassembled 
Merchandise as Assembled in 
Picture or Illustration; 
Prohibition.188 
 
83 (West 1996); § 56:8-86; § 56:8-93; §  56:8-99; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-104 (West 2000); 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-108 (West 2001); N.J. STAT. ANN. §. 56:8-110 (West 2002); N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 56:8-115 (West 2002); §. 56:8-120; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-130 (West 2003); § 56:8-
137; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-153 (West 2004); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-157 (West 2005); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. §. 56:8-161 (West 2005); § 56:8-170 ; § 56:8-175; § 56:8-185; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 
56:8-196 (West 2014). 
 181  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-2 (West 1960). 
 182  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-2.13 (West 1979). 
 183  N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-3 to 14.4 (West 1960); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-15 to 18 
(West 1971). 
 184  § 56:8-15; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-19 (West 1971); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-20 (West 
1999). 
 185  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-2.32 (West 2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-14.7 (West 1999); 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-24 (West 1975); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-25 (West 1975); N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 56:8-28 (West 1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-31 (West 1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-
36 (West 1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-48 (West 1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-52(b) (West 
1991); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-53.5 (West 2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-56(c) (West 1991); 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-59 (West 1991); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-78 (West 1995); N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 56:8-89 (West 1998); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-97 (West 1999); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-
111 (West 2002); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-118 (West 2003); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-134 (West 
2003); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-138.2 (West 2014); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-147 (West 2004); 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-152 (West 2004); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-165 (West 2005); N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 56:8-174 (West 2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-180 (West 2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 
56:8-195 (West 2009).  
 186  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-12 (West 1960). 
 187  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-14.5 (West 1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-14.6 (West 1999). 
 188  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-2.4 (West 1973). 
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b. Sale, Attempt to Sell or Offer for 
Sale of Merchandise Without Tag 
or Label with Selling Price.189 
c. Copy of Transaction or Contract; 
Provision to Customer.190 
d. “Going Out of Business Sale”; 
Time Limits.191 
e. Refund Policy Disclosure Act.192 
f. Solicitation of Used Goods or 
Wares by Profit-Making Enterprise; 
Disclosures.193 
g. Misrepresentation of Geographic 
Origin or Location of 
Merchandise.194 
h. Raincheck Policy Disclosure Act.195 
i. Unit Price Disclosure Act.196 
j. Resale of Tickets.197 
k. Health Clubs.198 
l. Child Product Safety.199 
m. Information Services.200 
n. Change in Telecommunications 
Services Providers.201 
o. Pet Purchase Protection Act.202 
p. Unlawful Selling of Certain 
Merchandise at Excessive Price 
During a State of Emergency.203 
 
 189  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-2.5 (West 1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-2.6 (West 1973). 
 190  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-2.22 (West 1982). 
 191  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-2.8 (West 1979). 
 192  N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-2.14 to 56:8-2.21 (West 1982). 
 193  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-2.23 (West 1985). 
 194  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-2.25 (West 1997). 
 195  N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-2.28 to 56:8-2.32 (West 2006). 
 196  N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-21 to 56:8-25 (West 1975). 
 197  N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-26 to 56:8-38 (West 2008). 
 198  N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-39 to 56:8-48 (West 1987). 
 199  N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-49 to 56:8-53.5 (West 1991). 
 200  N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-54 to 56:8-60 (West 1991). 
 201  N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-86 to 56:8-91 (West 1998). 
 202  N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-92 to 56:8-97 (West 1999). 
 203  N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-107 to 56:8-109 (West 2001). 
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q. Gift Certificate or Card; Value; 
Expiration; Dormancy Fee; Balance 
Under Five Dollars; Penalty.204 
r. Prepaid Calling Cards and 
Services.205 
3. Food and Drugs 
a. Sale of Non-Prescription Drugs, 
Infant Formula and Baby Food 
Beyond Expiration Date.206 
b. Halal Food Consumer Protection 
Act.207 
c. Kosher Food Consumer Protection 
Act.208 
d. Misrepresentation of Identity of 
Food in Menus or Advertisements 
of Eating Establishments.209 
e. Unsolicited Credit Cards and 
Checks.210 
4. Cars 
a. Sale of Used Cars.211 
b. Motor Vehicle Window Tinting.212 
c. Sale of Vehicle Protection Product 
Warranties.213 
5. Construction 
a. Contractors’ Registration Act.214 
b. Contractors’ Contracts; Required 
Terms and Conditions.215 
6. Employment and Conditions of 
a. Temporary Help Services.216 
 
 204  N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-110 to 56:8-112 (West 2012). 
 205  N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-175 to 56:8-181 (West 2007). 
 206  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-2.27 (West 1998). 
 207  N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-98 to 56:8-103 (West 2000). 
 208  N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-61 to 56:8-66 (West 1994). 
 209  N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-2.9 to 56:8-2.12 (West 1979). 
 210  N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-153 to 56:8-156 (West 2004). 
 211  N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8- 67 to 56:8-80 (West 1997). 
 212  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-117 (West 2003); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-118 (West 2003). 
 213  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-167 (West2007). 
 214  N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-136 to N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-152 (West 2004). 
 215  Id. 
 216  N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-1.1 to N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8.2 (West 2007). 
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b. International Labor Matching.217 
c. Industrial Hygienist Truth in 
Advertising Act.218 
d. Exemption from Consumer Fraud 
Law, Certain Real Estate 
Licensees.219 
7. Fraudulent and Unlawful Practices 
a. Operation Simulating 
Governmental Agency as 
Unlawful Practice.220 
b. Scheme to Not Sell Item or Service 
Advertised.221 
c. Notification to Person that He Has 
Won Prize and Requiring Him to 
Perform Act.222 
d. Solicitation of Funds or 
Contributions, or Sale or Offer for 
Sale of Goods or Services Under 
False Representation of 
Solicitation for Charitable or 
Nonprofit Organization or of 
Benefit for Handicapped 
Persons.223 
e. Senior Citizens; Home Solicitation 
for Certain Loans Prohibited.224 
f. Safety Professional Truth in 
Advertising Act.225 
g. Telemarketing Calls.226 
h. Unsolicited Advertisements Over 
Telephone Lines.227 
 
 217  N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-185 to N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-195 (West 2009). 
 218  N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-81 to N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-85 (West 1996). 
 219  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-19.1 (West 2004). 
 220  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-2.1 (West 1968). 
 221  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-2.2 (West 1969). 
 222  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8.2.3 (West 1969). 
 223  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-2.7 (West 2017). 
 224  N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-104 to 56:8-106 (West 2000). 
 225  N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-113 to 56:8-116 (West 2002). 
 226  N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-119 to 56:8-135 (West 2003). 
 227  N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-157 to 56:8-160 (West 2005). 
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i. Security of Personal 
Information.228 
j. Internet Dating Safety Act.229 
 
The proposed structural reorganization would clarify and simplify the Act 
making it easier for practitioners and laypersons to navigate and 
understand. 
B. Substantive Changes to the Act 
New Jersey’s case law pertaining to the NJCFA navigates the 
broad concepts set forth in the Act.  In the absence of an extensive 
legislative history,230 the judiciary has been called upon to interpret 
significant aspects of the Act, including: pre-suit demand for a refund; 
the extraterritorial application of the Act to nationwide class actions; fee-
shifting for technical violations;231 and mandatory treble damages.232  
Recently, legislation has been introduced in an effort to amend or codify 
the aforementioned issues.233 
Over the past several years, bills regarding the Consumer Fraud 
Act have been introduced in the Legislature.  The bills identified in this 
Article that were introduced in prior legislative sessions have not yet 
moved through the legislative process nor have they been enacted.  The 
bills introduced in the 2018-2019 legislative session have not had the 
opportunity to move through the process as of publication.  As a result, 
although the Commission does not generally work in areas that are a 
current focus of the Legislature, the fact that the legislative proposals 
currently under consideration do not comprehensively address all the 
issues the NJLRC has reviewed means that the NJLRC has continued to 
work in the area of consumer fraud with the expectation of furnishing a 
“Final Report” to the Legislature, that supplements and supports the work 
being done by that august body. 
 
 228  N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-161 to 56:8-166 (West 2006). 
 229  N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-168 to 56:8-174 (West 2007). 
 230  Skeer v. EMK Motors, Inc., 187 N.J. Super. 465, 471 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1982). 
 231  B.J.M. Insulation & Constr., Inc. v. Evans, 287 N.J. Super. 513, 517 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1996).  
 232  N.J.S.A. 56:8-19 (2016).  
 233  Assemb. 303, 218th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.J. 2018); see also Assemb. 1556, 218th Leg., 
1st Sess. (N.J. 2018) (discussing proposed revisions to regarding the pre-suit demand 
requirement under certain circumstances).  
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C. Plaintiff’s Pre-Suit Demand 
In Bosland v. Warnock Dodge, Inc.234 a consumer purchased a 
vehicle from an automobile dealer.  At the time of her purchase, the buyer 
was unaware that the seller had included undisclosed service fees in her 
registration paperwork.235  Rather than seek a refund of these fees, the 
buyer filed a complaint against the defendant and alleged a violation of 
the Consumer Fraud Act.236  In dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint, the 
trial court found that “she never complained about these charges . . . [and] 
these fees were Defendant[‘]s profit . . . paid without objection.”237  The 
Appellate Division disagreed with the lower court’s dismissal of the 
plaintiff’s cause of action and explicitly rejected the premise that a pre-
suit demand was required in order to sustain an action under the 
NJCFA.238  The defendant’s petition for certification, on the issue of 
whether a pre-suit demand was an essential prerequisite for a CFA claim 
was granted by the New Jersey Supreme Court.239 
In reviewing this matter, the Court examined the plain language 
of the Consumer Fraud Act.240  The Court explicitly found that: “[t]he 
plain language of the CFA [did] not . . . impose upon any putative 
plaintiff the requirement that he or she first seek a remedy directly from 
the offending merchant.”  Rather, “any person who suffers an 
ascertainable loss” resulting from a defendant’s violation of the CFA may 
file an action.241  The Court went on to find that reading a pre-suit demand 
requirement into the Act could conceivably “permit practices that the 
statute was designed to deter . . . to continue unabated and 
unpunished.”242  Given the clear legislative intent to “empower 
consumers to seek to secure relief for themselves and for others who may 
not be aware that they have been victimized,” the court refused to adopt 
this requirement.243 
The Court acknowledged that it could imagine circumstances in 
which a pre-suit demand for relief might be appropriate.244  Unwavering 
in its holding, the Court explained that “the language and intent of the 
 
 234  Bosland v. Warnock Dodge, Inc., 197 N.J. 543, 543 (2009). 
 235  Id. at 548.  
 236  Id. 
 237  Id. at 549. 
 238  Id. at 550.  
 239  Id.  
 240  Bosland, 197 N.J. at 557. 
 241  Id. 
 242  Id. at 561. 
 243  Id. 
 244  Id. at 562. 
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statute are clear . . . its purposes are plain” and that the requirement of a 
pre-suit demand for relief, “call[s] for an examination and weighing of 
public policy considerations not within the language of the CFA itself.”245  
In affirming the decision of the Appellate Court, the Supreme Court 
advised the defendants that the requirement of a pre-suit demand for a 
refund involved, “an examination and a weighing of public policy 
considerations that . . . are [reserved] for the Legislature.246  Such a 
consideration follows. 
It appears that, after examining the subject matter and weighing 
the public policy considerations set forth in Bosland, Assembly Bills 
A303247 and A1556248 were pre-filed for introduction during the 2018-
2019 legislative session.  Each bill seeks to amend N.J. Rev. Stat. § 56:8-
19.  Although these two bills vary slightly in their approach, both require 
an aggrieved consumer issue a pre-suit demand for a refund upon the 
seller.  These bills seek to avoid the use of the NJCFA to punish 
merchants for accidental violations of the Act or honest mistakes made 
during the course of a consumer transaction.  Furthermore, the 
requirement that a plaintiff file a pre-suit demand for relief appears to be 
consistent with New Jersey’s long-standing policy requiring plaintiffs to 
seek “mitigation” in all cases involving claims for damages.249 
D. “Only In New Jersey” 
As a state with some of the strongest remedies for consumers, the 
possibility exists that out-of-state litigants may wish to avail themselves 
of New Jersey’s Consumer Protection statutes.250  The traditional rule is 
that litigation is conducted on behalf of the individual named parties 
 
 245  Id. 
 246  Bosland, 197 N.J. at 562. 
 247  Assemb. 303, 218th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.J. 2018).  
 248  Assemb. 1556, 218th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.J. 2018). 
 249  See, e.g., State by Comm’r of Transp. v. Weiswasser, 149 N.J. 320 (1997) (finding 
condemnee seeking severance damages in partial-taking condemnation action has duty to 
mitigate those damages); Martin Marietta Corp. v. New Jersey Nat’l Bank, 653 F.2d 779 (3d 
Cir. 1981) (remanding an action against bank for wrongful conversion of sand to determine 
whether buyer reasonably discharged their duty to mitigate damages under New Jersey law 
for lost profits); Fanarjian v. Moskowitz, 237 N.J. Super. 395 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989) 
(stating commercial landlords have duty to mitigate damages.); Frank Stamato & Co. v. 
Borough of Lodi, 4 N.J. 14, 21 (1950) (involving the requirement to mitigate damages in a 
contract action); Ostrowski v. Azzara, 111 N.J. 429, 437 (1988) (analyzing the mitigation of 
damages in a tort action); Covino v. Peck, 233 N.J. Super. 612, 616 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1989); Stark v. Nat’l Research and Design Corp., 33 N.J. Super. 315, 323 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div.1954) (illustrating breach of an agreement for assignment of lease of business 
premises). 
 250  See Shepherd, supra note 7, at 18. 
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only.251  If, however, a litigant believes that his or her claim against a 
corporation is too small or the expense of prosecuting such a claim is too 
large, they may seek to initiate class action litigation.252  If specific 
requirements are met,253 a trial court may certify a class action in order to 
equalize the ability of the claimants to, “prepare and pay for the advocacy 
of their rights.”254  To the consternation of the business community, New 
Jersey courts have determined that class actions are one mechanism that 
a plaintiff may employ in order to litigate consumer fraud actions.255 
In International Union of Operating Engineers Local No. 68 v. 
Merck & Co., Inc., the New Jersey Supreme Court found that the 
frequency of nationwide class certification is rare.256  The scrutiny that 
potential plaintiffs are required to undergo in order to be certified as a 
nationwide class frequently results in the denial of class certification.257  
The Court also noted that, “[the] application of the law of a single state 
to all members of such a class is even more rare.”258  Under the right 
circumstances, however, the possibility remains that the size of a class 
could be expanded to include non-New Jersey residents whenever a New 
Jersey corporation is a defendant. 
In an attempt to narrow the use of the New Jersey Consumer 
Fraud Act by out-of-state litigants or nationwide classes, legislation has 
been introduced that would limit the Act solely to New Jersey 
residents.259  Under the proposed legislation, the New Jersey Consumer 
Fraud Act would “apply only to New Jersey residents, or to transactions 
that take place in the State.”260  Clarifying the extraterritorial application 
of the NJCFA would make it clear that the purpose of the Act is to protect 
New Jersey consumers.261  The proposed legislation would not, however, 
 
 251  Dugan v. TGI Fridays, Inc., 231 N.J. 24, 46 (2017).  
 252  Id. at 46; see Frink v. Ricoh Corp., 365 N.J. Super. 520, 520 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 
2003).  
 253  A discussion of the requirements necessary to certify a class action are beyond the 
scope of this note.  See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 4:32-1(a); see generally PAUL DEPETRIS, N.J. 
CONSUMER FRAUD ACT & FORMS 1 (2017) (discussing class actions in the context of the 
Consumer Fraud Act).  
 254  Frink, 365 N.J. Super. at 537.  
 255  Id. 
 256  Int’l Union of Operating Engineers Local No. 68 Welfare Fund v. Merck & Co., Inc. 
192 N.J. 372, 394 n.3 (2007).  
 257  See id. Beegal v. Park West Gallery, 394 N.J. Super. 98, 98 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2007); Hannan v. Weichert South Jersey, No. A-5525-05T5, 2007 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 
1238, at *35-36 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. April 17, 2007).   
 258  Id. 
 259  Assemb. 303, 218th Leg., 1st Sess., at § 2 (N.J. 2018). 
 260  Id.  
 261  See Shepherd, supra note 7, at 18. 
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eliminate an out-of-state consumer’s cause of action, in either contract or 
tort, against a New Jersey based company. 
E. Treble Damages; Fee Awards For Technical Violations. 
i. Treble Damages 
Since 1971, individual consumers have been permitted to bring 
private actions to recover refunds and treble damages for violations of the 
New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act.262  To be eligible to collect treble 
damages, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant’s conduct was 
unlawful and demonstrate an ascertainable loss.263  In addition, the 
claimant must also establish “a causal relationship between the unlawful 
conduct and the ascertainable loss.”264  If a plaintiff is successful in 
proving all three of the aforementioned elements then the award of legal 
and/or equitable relief, treble damages and reasonable attorney’s fees are 
mandatory.265  For the purpose of imposing treble damages, the NJCFA 
does not discriminate between a nefarious merchant and one who was 
acting in good faith with no intent to defraud a consumer. 
ii. Technical Violations 
In New Jersey, if a consumer-fraud plaintiff is able to prove both 
an unlawful practice under the NJCFA and an ascertainable loss then an 
award of treble damages and attorneys’ fees is mandatory under N.J. Rev. 
Stat. § 56:8-19.266  The compulsory language of the statute would be 
tested in a case involving a “technical” violation of the New Jersey 
Consumer Fraud Act. 
The defendant in BJM Insulation & Construction, Inc. v. 
Evans,267 having been sued for an alleged breach of a home repair 
contract, denied the allegations and interposed a defense that the plaintiff 
had, among other things, violated the Consumer Fraud Act.268  After 
completing discovery, the defendant successfully moved for summary 
judgment.269  The trial court judge noted in the order of dismissal that the 
 
 262  Dugan v. TGI Fridays, Inc., 231 N.J. 24, 50-51 (2017). 
 263  Id. at 52.  
 264  Id. 
 265  Id. at 80.  
 266  BJM Insulation & Constr., Inc. v. Evans, 287 N.J. Super. 513, 513 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1996) (citing Cox v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 138 N.J. 2 (1994)).  
 267  Id. 
 268  Id. at 515.  
 269  Id. 
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plaintiff had violated the provisions of the CFA.270  The trial court, 
however, denied the defendant’s request for attorneys’ fees and costs.271  
The defendant appealed this decision.272 
The Appellate Division held, “. . . the question of whether a trial 
judge has the discretion to deny counsel fees to a successful claimant of 
Consumer Fraud Act protection is no longer an open one.”273  The Court 
made it clear that if a consumer-fraud plaintiff is able to prove both an 
unlawful practice under the NJCFA and an ascertainable loss then an 
award of attorneys’ fees is mandatory under N.J. Rev. Stat. § 56:8-19.274  
Finding that reasonable counsel fees serve as a financial obligation owed 
by a claimant, the Court rejected the plaintiff’s argument suggesting that 
a separate, “ascertainable loss” must be proffered before one could 
recoup counsel fees and costs.275  The Court reasoned that, “. . . the plain 
sense of the Act . . . [is] to ensure that the financial burden to one who 
claims the Act’s protection is minimized . . . .”276 
Finally, the Court addressed the plaintiff’s argument that any 
transgression of the Act should be forgiven because it was merely a 
“technical” violation.277  To this request for leniency, the Court could 
only find one answer, “. . . the Consumer Fraud Act [would make] no 
distinction between ‘technical’ violations and more ‘substantive’ 
ones.”278  A dispensation for technical violations of the Act would require 
legislative intervention. 
Assembly Bill A303 has been introduced to the Legislature to 
address the mandatory imposition of treble damages and attorneys’ fees 
against merchants whose alleged violation of the Act is technical in 
nature.  If enacted, this legislation would effectively amend N.J. Rev. 
Stat. § 56:8-19 to leave the imposition of treble damages against a vendor 
to the discretion of the trial court judge.  The relevant portion of the 
statute would be amended to read: 
In any action under this section, the court may, in addition to 
any other appropriate legal or equitable relief, award up to 
threefold the actual damages sustained by any person in 
interest.279 
 
 270  Id. 
 271  BJM Insulation & Constr., Inc., 287 N.J. Super. at 513. 
 272  Id. 
 273  Id. (citing Cox v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 138 N.J. 2 (1994)).  
 274  Id. at 516. 
 275  Id. at 517. 
 276  Id. 
 277  BJM Insulation & Constr., 287 N.J. Super. at 517. 
 278  Id. at 518.  
 279  Assemb. 303, 218th Leg., 1st Sess., at § 7(a) (N.J. 2018).  The italicized text represents 
the proposed changes to the statute. 
SILVER 2018 
268 SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL [Vol. 42:2 
In addition, subsection c.1 of this bill provides: 
Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection a. of this 
section, attorneys’ fees, filing fees, and reasonable costs of 
suit shall not be awarded for a technical violation of P.L. 196, 
c.39 (C.56:8-1 et seq.). 
In order to be exonerated for a “technical violation” of the Act, the 
merchant must have been acting in “good faith” and with “no intent to 
defraud the consumer.”280  In addition, the violation must neither impact 
the quality of the product nor service provided,281 nor result in an 
ascertainable loss to the person.282  The proposed legislation appears to 
provide those who technically violate the NJCFA with the dispensation 
denied to the plaintiff in BJM Insulation & Construction, Inc. v. Evans. 
Since the Commission has not yet completed its process in this 
area of the law and has not issued a formal recommendation regarding 
modifications to the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act it will continue to 
monitor the pending legislation and engage in outreach to the 
stakeholders and scholars in this area in order to provide support to the 
Legislature. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The interactions between consumers and merchants that were 
once parochial and familiar have become more cosmopolitan and 
impersonal.  Over time, the bedrock legal principle of caveat emptor 
began to crumble with the collective realization that innocent people 
deserved to be protected from the “thieves, forgers and rapscallions”283 
among us. 
Forged from the irons of the American Industrial Revolution, the 
federal government established the Federal Trade Commission.  In the 
years that followed, the F.T.C. would come to protect consumers from 
deceptive practices and acts in commerce.  By 1960, New Jersey 
recognized the necessity of defending its own citizenry from the 
predatory practices of unscrupulous merchants.  Thereafter, and for over 
a decade, the Attorney General emerged as an individual anointed by the 
Legislature to shield consumers from harm.  This “army of one” would 
soon be joined by legions of “private attorneys general” each of whom 
would come armed with the sword of mandatory treble damages and 
attorneys’ fees. 
 
 280  Id. at § 7(c)(2). 
 281  Id. at § 7(c)(2)(a). 
 282  Id. at § 7(c)(2)(b). 
 283  CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. 35 (1870) (remarks of Representative Farnsworth). 
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A hero is “a [person] admired for [their] achievements and noble 
qualities and considered a model or ideal.”284  With the advent of modern 
consumer protection laws, the marketplace now contains two powerful 
factions—merchants and consumers.  For some, the New Jersey 
Consumer Fraud Act is lauded as the hero of the consumer protection 
movement.  For others, it is the villain of all commercial enterprises.  The 
answer to the question of whether the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act 
is a “hero” or a “villain” is clear to those who champion a specific interest.  
For those in the middle, the question will remain as difficult to answer as 
which superheroes are better “Marvel or DC?” 
 
 
 284  Hero, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1986). 
